ishment? men who, at the first note of the flute-player,
say,--That is the Antiope, or the Andromache, when we have not even a
suspicion of it. There is no need for me to speak of the faculties of
taste or smell; organs in which there is a degree of intelligence, however
faulty it may be. Why should I speak of touch, and of that kind of touch
which philosophers call the inner one, I mean the touch of pleasure or
pain? in which alone the Cyrenaics think that there is any judgment of the
truth, because pleasure or pain are felt. Can any one then say that there
is no difference between a man who is in pain and a man who is in
pleasure? or can any one think that a man who entertains this opinion is
not flagrantly mad?

But such as those things are which we say are perceived by the senses,
such also are those things which are said to be perceived, not by the
senses themselves, but by the senses after a fashion; as these things--that
is white, this is sweet, that is tuneful, this is fragrant, that is rough.
We have these ideas already comprehended by the mind, not by the senses.
Again, this is a house, that is a dog. Then the rest of the series
follows, connecting the more important links; such as these, which
embrace, as it were, the full comprehension of things;--If he is a man, he
is a mortal animal partaking of reason:--from which class of arguments the
notions of things are impressed upon us, without which nothing can be
understood, nor inquired into, nor discussed. But if those notions were
false, (for you seemed to me to translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} _notions_,) if, I say,
they were false, or impressed, or perceptions of such a kind as not to be
able to be distinguished from false ones; then I should like to know how
we were to use them? and how we were to see what was consistent with each
thing and what was inconsistent with it? Certainly no room at all is here
left for memory, which of all qualities is the one that most completely
contains, not only philosophy, but the whole practice of life, and all the
arts. For what memory can there be of what is false? or what does any one
remember which he does not comprehend and hold in his mind? And what art
can there be except that which consists not of one, nor of two, but of
many percepti