the mind, that what you say is, not that there is no difference between
the impressions, but only that there is none between certain appearances
and forms which they assume. As if perceptions were not judged of by their
appearance, which can deserve or obtain no credit if the mark by which we
are to distinguish truth from falsehood be taken away.

But that is a monstrous absurdity of yours, when you say that you follow
what is probable when you are not hindered by anything from doing so. In
the first place, how can you avoid being hindered, when what is false does
not differ from what is true? Secondly, what judgment can be formed of
what is true, when what is true is undistinguishable from what is false?
From these facts there springs unavoidably {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, that is to say, a
suspension of assent: for which Arcesilas is more consistent, if at least
the opinions which some people entertain of Carneades are correct. For if
nothing can be perceived, as they both agree in thinking, then all assent
is taken away. For what is so childish as to talk of approving of what is
not known? But even yesterday we heard that Carneades was in the habit, at
times, of descending to say that a wise man would be guided by opinion,
that is to say, would do wrong. To me, indeed, it is not so certain that
there is anything which can be comprehended, a question which I have now
spent too much time in discussing, as that a wise man is never guided by
opinion, that is to say, never assents to anything which is either false
or unknown.

There remains this other statement of theirs, that for the sake of
discovering the truth, one ought to speak against every side, and in
favour of every side. I wish then to see what they have discovered. We are
not in the habit, says he, of showing that. What then is the object of all
this mystery? or why do you conceal your opinion as something
discreditable? In order, says he, that those who hear us may be influenced
by reason rather than led by authority. What if they are influenced by
both? would there be any harm in that? However, they do not conceal one of
their theories, namely, that there is nothing which can be conceived. Is
authority no hindrance to entertaining this opinion? It seems to me to be
a great one. For who would ever have embraced so openly and undi