ned were thoroughly known. For although, if he
pleases, any one may find fault with this, namely with our denying that
anything can be perceived; at all events it is not a very serious reproof
that we can have to endure. But as for our statement that some things are
probable, this does not seem to you to be sufficient. Grant that it is
not. At least we ought to escape the reproaches which are incessantly
bandied about by you, "Can you, then, see nothing? can you hear nothing?
is nothing evident to you?"

I explained just now, on the testimony of Clitomachus, in what manner
Carneades intended those statements to be taken. Hear now, how the same
things are stated by Clitomachus in that book which he dedicated to Caius
Lucilius, the poet, after he had written on the same subject to Lucius
Censorinus, the one, I mean, who was consul with Marcus Manilius; he then
used almost these very words; for I am well acquainted with them, because
the first idea and arrangement of those very matters which we are now
discussing is contained in that book. He then uses the following language--

"The philosophers of the Academy are of opinion that there are differences
between things of such a kind that some appear probable, and others the
contrary. But that it is not a sufficient reason for one's saying that
some of these can be perceived and that others cannot, because many things
which are false are probable; but nothing false can be perceived and
known. Therefore, says he, those men are egregiously wrong who say that
the Academics deny the existence of the senses; for they have never said
that there is no such thing as colour, or taste, or sound; the only point
they argue for is, that there is not in them that peculiar characteristic
mark of truth and certainty which does not exist anywhere else."

And after having explained this, he adds, that there are two senses in
which the wise man may be said to suspend his assent: one, when it is
understood that he, as a general rule, assents to nothing; the other, when
he forbears answering, so as to say that he approves or disapproves of
anything, or, so as to deny or affirm anything. This being the case, he
approves of the one sense, so as never to assent to anything; and adheres
to the other, so as to be able to answer yes, or no, following probability
whenever it either occurs or is wanting. And that one may not be
astonished at one, who in every matter withholds himself from expressing
his