n such circumstances
there is an end to the whole system of life. For what must happen? Has the
wise man, when he embarks on board ship, a positive comprehension and
perception in his mind that he will have a successful voyage? How can he?
But suppose he goes from this place to Puteoli, thirty furlongs, in a
seaworthy vessel, with a good pilot, and in fine weather like this, it
appears probable that he will arrive there safe. According to appearances
of this kind, then, he will make up his mind to act or not to act; and he
will be more willing to find the snow white than Anaxagoras, who not only
denied that fact, but who affirmed, because he knew that water, from which
snow was congealed, was of a dark colour, that snow did not even look
white. And he will be influenced by anything which affects him in such a
way that the appearance is probable, and not interfered with by any
obstacle. For such a man is not cut out of stone or hewn out of oak. He
has a body, he has a mind, he is influenced by intellect, he is influenced
by his senses, so that many things appear to him to be true, and yet not
to have conspicuous and peculiar characteristics by which to be perceived.
And therefore the wise man does not assent to them, because it is possible
that something false may exist of the same kind as this true thing. Nor do
we speak against the senses differently from the Stoics, who say that many
things are false, and are very different from the appearance which they
present to the senses.

XXXII. But if this is the case, that one false idea can be entertained by
the senses, you will find some one in a moment who will deny that anything
can be perceived by the senses. And so, while we are silent, all
perception and comprehension is done away with by the two principles laid
down, one by Epicurus and the other by you. What is Epicurus's maxim?--If
anything that appears to the senses be false, then nothing can be
perceived. What is yours?--The appearances presented to the senses are
false.--What is the conclusion? Even if I hold my tongue, it speaks for
itself, that nothing can be perceived. I do not grant that, says he, to
Epicurus. Argue then with him, as he is wholly at variance with you, but
leave me alone, who certainly agree with you so far, that the senses are
liable to error. Although nothing appears so strange to me, as that such
things should be said, especially by Antiochus, to whom the propositions
which I have just mentio