that
admiral Byng was unjustly condemned. The sentence might be strictly
legal, and, at the same time very severe, according to the maxim,
_summum jus, summa injuria_. In such cases, and perhaps in such cases
only, the rigour of the law ought to be softened by the lenient hand of
the royal prerogative. That this was the case of admiral Byng appears
from the warm and eager intercession of his jury, a species of
intercession which hath generally, if not always, prevailed at the foot
of the throne, when any thing favourable for the criminal had appeared
in the course of the trial. How much more then might it have been
expected to succeed, when earnestly urged as a case of conscience, in
behalf of a man whom his judges had expressly acquitted of cowardice and
treachery, the only two imputations that rendered him criminal in the
eyes of the nation! Such an interposition of the crown in parliamentary
transactions was irregular, unnecessary, and at another juncture might
have been productive of violent heats and declamation. At present,
however, it passed without censure, as the effect of inattention, rather
than a design to encroach upon the privileges of the house.
BILL TO RELEASE THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT-MARTIAL, &c
The message being communicated, a bill was immediately brought in, to
release the members of the court-martial from the obligation of secrecy,
and passed through the lower house without opposition; but in the house
of lords it appeared to be destitute of a proper foundation. They sent
a message to the commons, desiring them to give leave that such of the
members of the court-martial as were members of that house might attend
their lordships, in order to be examined on the second reading of the
bill; accordingly they, and the rest of the court-martial, attended, and
answered all questions without hesitation. As they did not insist upon
any excuse, nor produce any satisfactory reason for showing that the man
they had condemned was a proper object of mercy, their lordships were
of opinion that there was no occasion for passing any such bill, which,
therefore, they almost unanimously rejected. It is not easy to conceive
what stronger reasons could be given for proving Mr. Byng an object of
mercy, than those mentioned in the letter sent to the board of admiralty
by the members of the court-martial, who were empowered to try the
imputed offence, consequently must have been deemed well qualified to
judge of h
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