G OF PRUSSIA.

During the recess of the armies, while the rigours of winter forced them
to suspend their hostile operations, and the greatest preparations were
making to open the campaign with all possible vigour, count Bestucheff,
great chancellor of Russia, wrote a circular letter to the primate,
senators, and ministers of the republic of Poland, setting forth, "That
the empress of Russia was extremely affected with the king of Poland's
distress, which she thought could not but excite the compassion of
all other powers, but more especially of his allies: that the fatal
consequences which might result from the rash step by the king of
Prussia, not only with respect to the tranquillity of Europe in
general, but of each power in particular, and more especially of the
neighbouring countries, were so evident, that the interest and safety of
the several princes rendered it absolutely necessary they should make it
a common cause; not only to obtain proper satisfaction for those courts
whose dominions had been so unjustly attacked, but likewise to prescribe
such bounds to the king of Prussia as might secure them from any future
apprehensions from so enterprising and restless a neighbour: that with
this view the empress was determined to assist the king of Poland with
a considerable body of troops, which were actually upon their march,*
under the command of general Apraxin; and that, as there would be an
absolute necessity for their marching through part of the territories
of Poland, her imperial majesty hoped the republic would not fail to
facilitate their march as much as possible."

* This letter was written in December, and the Russians, as
we observed before, began their march in November.

She further recommended to the republic, to take some salutary measures
for frustrating the designs of the king of Prussia, and restoring
harmony among themselves, as the most conducive measure to these good
purposes. In this, however, the Poles were so far from following her
advice, that, though sure of being sacrificed in this contest, which
side soever prevailed, they divided into parties with no less zeal than
if they had as much to hope from the prevalence of one side, as to fear
from that of the other. Some of the Palatines were for denying a
passage to the Russians, and others were for affording them the utmost
assistance in their power. With this cause of contention, others of a
more private nature fatally concurred