f the whole coast, from St. Valery to Bourdeaux. In
consequence of the above information the secret expedition was planned;
instructions were given to sir John Mordaunt and admiral Hawke to make
a vigorous impression on the French coast, and all the other measures
projected, which, it was imagined, would make an effectual diversion,
by obliging the enemy to employ a great part of their forces at home,
disturb and shake the credit of their public loans, impair the strength
and resources of their navy, disconcert their extensive and dangerous
operations of war, and, finally, give life, strength, and lustre to the
common cause and his majesty's arms. The board of inquiry took next into
consideration the several letters and explanatory instructions sent
to sir John Mordaunt, in consequence of some difficulties which might
possibly occur, stated by that general in letters to the minister,
previous to his sailing. Then they examined the report made to sir
Edward Hawke by admiral Broderick, and the captains of the men of war
sent to sound the French shore from Rochelle to fort Fouras, dated
September the twenty-ninth; the result of the councils af war on the
twenty-fifth and twenty-eighth; sir Edward Hawke's letter to sir
John Mordaunt on the twenty-seventh, and the general's answer on the
twenty-ninth: after which sir John Mordaunt was called upon to give
his reasons for not putting his majesty's instructions and orders
into execution. This he did in substance as follows: the attempt on
Rochefort, he understood, was to have been on the footing of a _coup de
main_ or surprise, which it would be impossible to execute if the design
was discovered, or the alarm taken. He also understood that an attempt
could not be made, nay that his majesty did not require it should,
unless a proper place for debarking, and a safe retreat for the troops
was discovered, particularly where the ships could protect them; and a
safe communication with the fleet, and conveyance of supplies from it,
were found. His sentiments, he said, were confirmed by a paper to this
purpose, delivered to him by sir John Ligonier, on his first being
appointed to command the expedition. It was likewise probable, he
thought, that although Rochefort should have remained in the situation
in which colonel Clark and the pilot Thierry had seen it three years
before, yet that a few days' preparation could make it sufficiently
defensible against a _coup de main_. Judging theref