ore the dependence
on such an operation alone improper, he applied to the ministry for two
more old battalions, and artillery for a regular attack to force the
place, which, from its construction, appeared as difficult to be made
defensible against the latter, as easily secured against the former.
But this request being refused, he still thought it his duty to obey his
orders on the footing on which the expedition was planned, especially
as he understood his instructions were discretionary, regarding the
circumstances of the time, the condition of the place, and the nature of
the service. He recited the positive and credible intelligence received,
as well before the embarkation as during the voyage, of the alarm given
to France, and the preparations made along the French coasts from Brest
and St. Maloes to Rochefort; the accidents that kept the fleet hovering
along the coasts, and prevented the possibility of an attempt by
surprise; the reports of all the gentlemen employed in sounding the
coasts, so contrary to the intelligence given by Thierry the pilot; the
opinion of the council of war, by which he was enjoined to act, and
with which his own judgment concurred; the endeavours used, after the
twenty-sixth, to find out some expedient for annoying the enemy and
executing his majesty's instructions; the attempt made to land, in
consequence of the resolution of the second council of war, which was
prevented by boisterous and stormy weather; and lastly, the reasons that
determined him, in concert with the other land officers, to return to
England.

Having considered all these circumstances, and examined several officers
who served in the expedition, the court of inquiry gave in the following
report to his majesty:--"It appears to us, that one cause of the
expedition having failed is, the not attacking fort Fouras by sea, at
the same time that it could have been attacked by land, agreeably to
the first design, which certainly must have been of the greatest utility
towards carrying your majesty's instructions into execution. It was at
first resolved by admiral Hawke; (Thierry, the pilot, having undertaken
the safe conduct of a ship to fort Fouras for that purpose), but
afterwards laid aside, upon the representation of vice-admiral Knowles,
that the Bar-fleur, the ship designed for that service, was a-ground,
at the distance of between four and five miles from the shore; but
as neither sir Edward Hawke nor the pilot could at