e, profitable, and available; but in the meantime they act
these things, they philosophize, they live and die, as at the command of
things indifferent. And yet none of the Ethiopians kill that dog; but he
sits in state, and is revered by all. But these men destroy and corrupt
their virtue, that they may obtain health and riches.

But the corollary which Chrysippus himself has given for a conclusion to
his doctrines seems to free us from the trouble of saying anything more
about it. For there being, says he, in Nature some things good,
some things bad, and some things between them both, which we call
indifferent; there is no man but would rather have the good than the
indifferent, and the indifferent than the bad. And of this we call
the gods to witness, begging of them by our prayers principally the
possession of good things, and if that may not be, deliverance from
evil; not desiring that which is neither good nor bad instead of good,
but willing to have it instead of evil. But this man, changing Nature
and inverting its order, removes the middle out of its own place into
the last, and brings back the last into the middle,--not unlike to those
tyrants who give the first place to the wicked,--and he gives us a law,
first to seek the good, and secondly the evil, and lastly to judge
that worst which is neither good nor evil; as if any one should place
infernal things next to celestial, thrusting the earth and earthly
things into Tartarus,

Where very far from hence, deep under ground,
Lies a vast gulf.
(Iliad, viii. 14.)

Having therefore said in his Third Book concerning Nature, that it
is more expedient for a fool to live than not, though he should never
attain to wisdom, he adds these words: "For such are the good things of
men, that even evil things do in a manner precede other things that are
in the middle place; not that these things themselves really precede,
but reason, which makes us choose rather to live, though we were to be
fools." Therefore also, though we were to be unjust, wicked, hated of
the gods, and unhappy; for none of these things are absent from those
that live foolishly. Is it then convenient rather to live miserably than
not to live miserably, and better to be hurt than not hurt, to be unjust
than not unjust, to break the laws than not to break them? That is, is
it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live
even against duty? Yes indeed, for it is worse to