d sovereign nation, to which loyalty and obedience
on the one side, and from which protection and privileges on the
other, would be due, yet the several sovereign States, whose people
were then citizens, were not only to continue in existence, but with
powers unimpaired, except so far as they were granted by the people to
the National Government.

Among the powers unquestionably possessed by the several States, was
that of determining what persons should and what persons should not be
citizens. It was practicable to confer on the Government of the Union
this entire power. It embraced what may, well enough for the purpose
now in view, be divided into three parts. _First_: The power to remove
the disabilities of alienage, either by special acts in reference to
each individual case, or by establishing a rule of naturalization to
be administered and applied by the courts. _Second_: Determining what
persons should enjoy the privileges of citizenship, in respect to the
internal affairs of the several States. _Third_: What native-born
persons should be citizens of the United States.

The first-named power, that of establishing a uniform rule of
naturalization, was granted; and here the grant, according to its
terms, stopped. Construing a Constitution containing only limited and
defined powers of government, the argument derived from this definite
and restricted power to establish a rule of naturalization, must be
admitted to be exceedingly strong. I do not say it is necessarily
decisive. It might be controlled by other parts of the Constitution.
But when this particular subject of citizenship was under
consideration, and, in the clause specially intended to define the
extent of power concerning it, we find a particular part of this
entire power separated from the residue, and conferred on the General
Government, there arises a strong presumption that this is all which
is granted, and that the residue is left to the States and to the
people. And this presumption is, in my opinion, converted into a
certainty, by an examination of all such other clauses of the
Constitution as touch this subject.

I will examine each which can have any possible bearing on this
question.

The first clause of the second section of the third article of the
Constitution is, "The judicial power shall extend to controversies
between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of
different States; between citizens of the same State, clai