The general question may be stated to be, whether the plaintiff's
_status_, as a slave, was so changed by his residence within that
territory, that he was not a slave in the State of Missouri, at the
time this action was brought.

In such cases, two inquiries arise, which may be confounded, but
should be kept distinct.

The first is, what was the law of the Territory into which the master
and slave went, respecting the relation between them?

The second is, whether the State of Missouri recognises and allows the
effect of that law of the Territory, on the _status_ of the slave, on
his return within its jurisdiction.

As to the first of these questions, the will of States and nations,
by whose municipal law slavery is not recognised, has been manifested
in three different ways.

One is, absolutely to dissolve the relation, and terminate the rights
of the master existing under the law of the country whence the parties
came. This is said by Lord Stowell, in the case of the slave Grace, (2
Hag. Ad. R., 94,) and by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of
Maria [Transcriber's Note: Marie] Louise _v._ Marot, (9 Louis. R.,
473,) to be the law of France; and it has been the law of several
States of this Union, in respect to slaves introduced under certain
conditions. (Wilson _v._ Isabel, 5 Call's R., 430; Hunter _v._ Hulcher
[Transcriber's Note: Fulcher], 1 Leigh, 172; Stewart _v._ Oaks, 5 Har.
and John., 107.)

The second is, where the municipal law of a country not recognising
slavery, it is the will of the State to refuse the master all aid to
exercise any control over his slave; and if he attempt to do so, in a
manner justifiable only by that relation, to prevent the exercise of
that control. But no law exists, designed to operate directly on the
relation of master and slave, and put an end to that relation. This is
said by Lord Stowell, in the case above mentioned, to be the law of
England, and by Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in the case of the
Commonwealth _v._ Aves, (18 Pick., 193,) to be the law of
Massachusetts.

The third is, to make a distinction between the case of a master and
his slave only temporarily in the country, _animo non manendi_, and
those who are there to reside for permanent or indefinite purposes.
This is said by Mr. Wheaton to be the law of Prussia, and was formerly
the statute law of several States of our Union. It is necessary in
this case to keep in view this distinction between those coun