and reduce them to a state of slavery?

These questions, which arise exclusively under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, this court, under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, has the rightful authority finally to decide.
And if we look beyond these questions, we come to the consideration
whether the rules of international law, which are part of the laws of
Missouri until displaced by some statute not alleged to exist, do or
do not require the _status_ of the plaintiff, as fixed by the laws of
the Territory of Wisconsin, to be recognised in Missouri. Upon such a
question, not depending on any statute or local usage, but on
principles of universal jurisprudence, this court has repeatedly
asserted it could not hold itself bound by the decisions of State
courts, however great respect might be felt for their learning,
ability, and impartiality. (See Swift _v._ Tyson, 16 Peters's R., 1;
Carpenter _v._ The Providence Ins. Co., Ib., 495; Foxcroft _v._
Mallet, 4 How., 353; Rowan _v._ Runnels, 5 How., 134.)

Some reliance has been placed on the fact that the decision in the
Supreme Court of Missouri was between these parties, and the suit
there was abandoned to obtain another trial in the courts of the
United States.

In Homer _v._ Brown, (16 How., 354,) this court made a decision upon
the construction of a devise of lands, in direct opposition to the
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, between the
same parties, respecting the same subject-matter--the claimant having
become nonsuit in the State court, in order to bring his action in the
Circuit Court of the United States. I did not sit in that case, having
been of counsel for one of the parties while at the bar; but, on
examining the report of the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff
in error, I find they made the point, that this court ought to give
effect to the construction put upon the will by the State court, to
the end that rights respecting lands may be governed by one law, and
that the law of the place where the lands are situated; that they
referred to the State decision of the case, reported in 3 Cushing,
390, and to many decisions of this court. But this court does not seem
to have considered the point of sufficient importance to notice it in
their opinions. In Millar _v._ Austin, (13 How., 218,) an action was
brought by the endorsee of a written promise. The question was,
whether it was negotiable under a statute