ard it suggested that there was any statute of the State
of Missouri bearing on this question. The customary law of Missouri is
the common law, introduced by statute in 1816. (1 Ter. Laws, 436.) And
the common law, as Blackstone says, (4 Com., 67,) adopts, in its full
extent, the law of nations, and holds it to be a part of the law of
the land.

I know of no sufficient warrant for declaring that any rule of
international law, concerning the recognition, in that State, of a
change of _status_, wrought by an extra-territorial law, has been
displaced or varied by the will of the State of Missouri.

I proceed then to inquire what the rules of international law
prescribe concerning the change of _status_ of the plaintiff wrought
by the law of the Territory of Wisconsin.

It is generally agreed by writers upon international law, and the rule
has been judicially applied in a great number of cases that wherever
any question may arise concerning the _status_ of a person, it must be
determined according to that law which has next previously rightfully
operated on and fixed that _status_. And, further, that the laws of a
country do not rightfully operate upon and fix the _status_ of persons
who are within its limits _in itinere_, or who are abiding there for
definite temporary purposes, as for health, curiosity, or occasional
business; that these laws, known to writers on public and private
international law as personal statutes, operate only on the
inhabitants of the country. Not that it is or can be denied that each
independent nation may, if it thinks fit, apply them to all persons
within their limits. But when this is done, not in conformity with the
principles of international law, other States are not understood to be
willing to recognise or allow effect to such applications of personal
statutes.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the operation of
the laws of the Territory of Wisconsin upon the _status_ of the
plaintiff was or was not such an operation as these principles of
international law require other States to recognise and allow effect
to.

And this renders it needful to attend to the particular facts and
circumstances of this case.

It appears that this case came on for trial before the Circuit Court
and a jury, upon an issue, in substance, whether the plaintiff,
together with his wife and children, were the slaves of the defendant.

The court instructed the jury that, "upon the facts in th