olerated,
operates on the condition of the slave, and produces immediate
emancipation; and that, where a slave thus becomes free, the master
cannot reduce him again to slavery.

Josephine _v._ Poultney, (Louisiana Annual Rep., 329,) "where the
owner removes with a slave into a State in which slavery is
prohibited, with the intention of residing there, the slave will be
thereby emancipated, and their subsequent return to the State of
Louisiana cannot restore the relation of master and slave." To the
same import are the cases of Smith _v._ Smith, (13 Louisiana Rep.,
441; Thomas _v._ Generis, Louisiana Rep., 483; Harry et al. _v._
Decker and Hopkins, Walker's Mississippi Rep., 36.) It was held that,
"slaves within the jurisdiction of the Northwestern Territory became
freemen by virtue of the ordinance of 1787, and can assert their claim
to freedom in the courts of Mississippi." (Griffith _v._ Fanny, 1
Virginia Rep., 143.) It was decided that a negro held in servitude in
Ohio, under a deed executed in Virginia, is entitled to freedom by the
Constitution of Ohio.

The case of Rhodes _v._ Bell (2 Howard, 307; 15 Curtis, 152) involved
the main principle in the case before us. A person residing in
Washington city purchased a slave in Alexandria, and brought him to
Washington. Washington continued under the law of Maryland, Alexandria
under the law of Virginia. The act of Maryland of November, 1796, (2
Maxcy's Laws, 351,) declared any one who shall bring any negro,
mulatto or other slave, into Maryland, such slave should be free. The
above slave, by reason of his being brought into Washington city, was
declared by this court to be free. This, it appears to me, is a much
stronger case against the slave than the facts in the case of Scott.

In Bush _v._ White, (3 Monroe, 104,) the court say:

"That the ordinance was paramount to the Territorial laws, and
restrained the legislative power there as effectually as a
Constitution in an organized State. It was a public act of the
Legislature of the Union, and a part of the supreme law of the land;
and, as such, this court is as much bound to take notice of it as it
can be of any other law."

In the case of Rankin _v._ Lydia, before cited, Judge Mills, speaking
for the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, says:

"If, by the positive provision in our code, we can and must hold our
slaves in the one case, and statutory provisions equally positive
decide against that right in the other, an