eated with contempt, Innocent IV would not have
been obliged, in 1254, to reiterate the instructions that no
condemnations to death or life imprisonment should be uttered without
consulting the Bishops; and in 1255 he enjoined Bishop and Inquisitor
to interpret in consultation any obscurities in the laws against
heresy, and to administer the lighter penalties of deprivation of
office and preferment. This recognition of episcopal jurisdiction was
annulled by Alexander IV, who, after some vacillation, in 1257
rendered the Inquisition independent by releasing it from the
necessity of consulting with the Bishops even in cases of obstinate
and confessed heretics, and this he repeated in 1260. Then there was
a reaction. In 1262, Urban IV, in an elaborate code of instructions,
formally revived the consultation in all cases involving the death
penalty or perpetual imprisonment; and this was repeated by Clement
IV in 1265. Either these instructions, however, were revoked in some
subsequent enactment, or they soon fell into desuetude, for in 1273,
Gregory X, after alluding to the action of Alexander IV in annulling
consultation, proceeds to direct that Inquisitors in deciding upon
sentences shall proceed in accordance with the counsel of the Bishops
or their delegates, so that the episcopal authority might share in
decisions of such moment."[1]

[1] Lea, op. cit., p. 335.

This decretal remained henceforth the law. But as the Inquisitors at
times seemed to act as if it did not exist, Boniface VIII and Clement
IV strengthened it by declaring null and void all grave sentences in
which the Bishop had not been consulted.[1] The consultation,
however, between the Bishop and Inquisitor could be conducted through
delegates. In insisting upon this, the Popes proved that they were
anxious to give the sentences of the Inquisition every possible
guarantee of perfect justice.

[1] _Sexto_, lib. v, tit. ii, cap. 17, _Per hoc_; Clementin. lib v.
tit. iii, cap. i, _Multorum querela_.

Another way in which the Popes labored to render the sentences of the
Inquisition just, was the institution of experts. As the questions
which arose before the tribunals in matters of heresy were often very
complex, "it was soon found requisite to associate with the
Inquisitors in the rendering of sentences men versed in the civil and
canon law, which had by this time become an intricate study,
requiring the devotion of a lifetime. Accordingly they were empow