not fanciful but real: "This is proved," he
says, "from the fact that the Popes permitted witches to be burned at
the stake; they would not have countenanced this, if these persons
were not real heretics, and their crimes only imaginary, for the
Church only punishes proved crimes."[1] Witchcraft was, therefore,
amenable to the tribunals of the lnquisition.[2]

[1] _Lucerna Inquisitorium_, Romae, 1584, p. 144.

[2] In a letter to one of the cardinals of the Holy Office, dated
1643, witchcraft is classed with heresy. Douais, _Documents_, vol. i,
p. ccliv. In practice, the heretical tendency of witchcraft was hard
to determine. Each judge, therefore, as a rule, pronounced sentence
according to his own judgment.

While the casuists thus increased the number of crimes which the
Inquisition could prosecute, on the other hand, they shortened the
judicial procedure then in vogue.

Following the Roman law, the Inquisition at first recognized three
forms of action in criminal cases--_accusatio, denuntiatio_, and
_inquisitio_. In the _accusatio_, the accuser formally inscribed
himself as able to prove his accusation; if he failed to do so, he
had to undergo the penalty which the prisoner would have incurred
(_poena talionis_).[1] "From the very beginning, he was placed in the
same position as the one he accused, even to the extent of sharing
his imprisonment."[2] The _denuntiatio_ did not in any way bind the
accuser; he merely handed in his testimony, and then ceased
prosecuting the case; the judge at once proceeded to take action
against the accused. In the _inquisitio_, there was no one either to
accuse or denounce the criminal; the judge cited the suspected
criminal before him and proceeded to try him. This was the most
common method of procedure; from it the Inquisition received its
name.[3]

[1] Tanon, op. cit., p. 260, n. 4.

[2] Tancrede, _Ordo judiciorum_, lib. ii.

[3] On these three forms of action, cf. Eymeric, _Directorium_, 3a
pars, p. 413 et seq.

The Inquisitorial procedure was therefore inspired by the Roman law.
But in practice the _accusatio_, which gave the prisoner a chance to
meet the charges against him, was soon abandoned. In fact the
Inquisitors were always most anxious to set it aside. Urban IV
enacted a decree, July 28, 1262, whereby they were allowed to proceed
_simpliciter et de plano, absque advocatorum strepitu et figura_.[1]
Bernard Gui insisted on this in his _Practica_.[2] Eymeric advis