truction? This is a momentous question. It
is the most important which can be presented to the country at the
moment of its anticipated triumph, when the fearful clash of arms is
about to subside and give place to the serious labor of conciliation and
reconstruction. To conquer the rebellion will be, at least, to make all
its aims utterly hopeless. Failure and disaster will be forever stamped
upon the ideas on which the revolution has been founded, and they, with
their inspiration, good or bad, will be permanently overthrown, together
with the men who have used them so efficiently for the inauguration and
continuance of this tremendous strife. There is wonderful power in the
success of an idea, as there is a corresponding influence in the utter
overthrow of its physical manifestations and efforts. A cause rendered
hopeless by defeat ceases to sustain the passions which it has excited,
under the influence of which it has made itself respectable and
powerful. If it be founded in truth and right, it will have within
itself the elements of resuscitation, and it can never become altogether
hopeless. But if it have no such basis of substantial truth, its failure
once is for all time. The hearts of men cannot long cling to such a
cause. Its traditions even become odious, and the effort will be to
ignore and forget its incidents, and to escape the discredit of having
participated in its ambitious struggles.

But to conquer the rebellion is not to subjugate the South. This is a
distinction of the utmost importance in attempting to estimate the
consequences of the great struggle. So far from the subjugation of the
Southern people resulting, in any contingency, the success of the Union
arms must be their regeneration and redemption. To overthrow the
confederate government will be only to relieve the people from its
grasp, and to reinstate them in the rights and liberties which they have
hitherto enjoyed. A combination of force, fraud, and self-delusion has
sustained the power of the rebel dynasty, and enabled it to wield the
influence and authority of the whole people of the seceding States, with
some few remarkable exceptions. To break up this combination will do
more than merely defeat a hostile power: it will, in effect, annihilate
the whole vicious organization, and leave its elements free to engage in
other combinations, more in accordance with right, and better calculated
to secure success and prosperity. It is not unreasonab