British centre and rear being
much more distant from the enemy than the van was. This alone would
cause the ships to come into battle successively instead of together,
a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood,
committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for the
line of battle flying until 5.30 P.M., near to sunset. In Hood's
understanding, while that signal flew the position of each ship was
determined by that of Graves's flagship. None could go closer than the
line through her parallel to the enemy. Hence Hood's criticism, which
is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betray
any consciousness that he himself needed any justification for his
division not having taken part.

"Had the centre gone to the support of the van, _and the signal for
the line been hauled down_, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the
example of close action, _even with the signal for the line flying_,
the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear
division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those ships
the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging,
or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal to
answer for."[101]

So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remained
what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the action, but
early in the night was informed that several of the van ships were too
crippled to permit this. He held his ground, however, in sight of the
French, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time.
They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10th
had disappeared. From their actions during this interval, Hood had
inferred that de Grasse meant to get back into the Chesapeake without
further fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to anticipate
the enemy in so doing. Though some ships were crippled aloft, the
British batteries were practically intact, nor had men enough been
disabled to prevent any gun in the fleet from being fought. Could but
a single working day be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive
order could be assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering
Cornwallis, and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left in
the Bay. In the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as
the idle talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore in
life; but in the case of Hood it must be received wit