to forget what I owe to the public service in
replying to him. It is easy to say, why don't you move troops to
Candahar; and why don't you move troops somewhere else? The noble
lord finds no difficulty in this; but does he recollect that 26,000
camels, carrying the baggage of the troops in Affghanistan, were
sacrificed before they reached it? The noble lord says, 'Who
contemplated the abandonment of Affghanistan?' _I could tell the
noble lord_. Beware, I say; let the noble lord beware of
indiscriminate reflections upon those in office."

It is now known "_who_ contemplated the abandonment of Affghanistan,"
without a struggle to punish the perfidy of the Affghans, to avenge
the insults to our honour, or to redress the wrongs of our countrymen.
Lord Auckland resolved on this course, without even an aspiration
after any thing better than a safe retreat. Nor is such a resolution
to be wondered at when the state of our military preparations is
considered. A letter from Sir Jasper Nicolls, of 24th January 1842,
to the statements in which we see no contradiction in the _Blue Book_,
exhibits at once the condition of our resources, and the feelings of
the head of the Indian army.

"After I had dispatched my letter to your Lordship in Council, I
received the note, of which I transmit a copy herewith, from the
Adjutant-General, and I had a second discussion with Mr. Clerk on the
subject of holding our ground at Jellalabad against any Affghan
power or force, in view to retrieving our position at Cabul, by
advancing upon it, at the fit season, simultaneously from Candahar
to Jellalabad. Having thus regained our position, and the influence
which such proof of power must give, not only in Affghanistan but
amongst all the neighbouring states, we should withdraw with dignity
and undiminished honour. Admitting the undeniable force of this
argument, I am greatly inclined to doubt that we have at present
either army or funds sufficient to renew this contest. Money may,
perhaps, be attainable, but soldiers are not, without leaving India
bare. Shortly before I left Calcutta, there were at least 33,000 men
in our pay in Affghanistan and Scinde, including Shah Soojah's troops,
but not the rabble attached to his person. How insufficient that
number has been to awe the barbarous and at first disunited tribes
of Affghanistan and Scinde, our numerous conflicts, our late reverses,
and our heavy losses fully prove. I admit that a blind confidence