ng the night of the 28th-29th. The
plan, therefore, of an advance through the Orange Free State, which
was adopted by the Cabinet on the following day, by implication
assumed that the force assigned to Sir George White for the defence of
Natal would be sufficient to check the threatened invasion until a
forward movement of the army corps in the western theatre of war
should draw away from the republican host the Free State men for the
protection of their own territory.

[Sidenote: Situation when Sir R. Buller arrived.]

The events of the first three weeks of the war showed that Sir George
White, without assistance, would not be able to protect Natal, and the
situation which met General Buller on his disembarkation in South
Africa on the morning of the 31st October could not but cause him
grave anxiety. The Natal Field Force, after three strenuous efforts at
Talana, Elandslaagte and Lombards Kop to repel the enemy's columns of
invasion, lay concentrated at Ladysmith, and to the north, east, and
west was already closely watched by the enemy in superior strength.
General Buller was convinced that the troops needed rest, and could
for a time only act on the defensive. He therefore telegraphed to
General White, on 1st November, suggesting that he should entrench and
await events either at Ladysmith or at Colenso. Sir George's reply
showed that he had already entrenched himself at Ladysmith, and could
not now withdraw. South of Ladysmith there were only very weak posts
at Colenso and Estcourt, and one regular battalion at Maritzburg. For
the moment, the safety of the capital of Natal appeared to be
precarious, and Sir Redvers even deemed it necessary to request the
Naval Commander-in-Chief to take steps for the protection of Durban
from land attack. In Cape Colony the Boer forces close to the Orange
river had been strengthened by reinforcements from the commandos
originally assigned to watch the Basuto border. Moreover, there was
some reason to believe that another commando from the north was moving
down upon Kimberley, and this report, coupled with the lack of news
from Mafeking, rendered it for the moment doubtful whether
Baden-Powell might not have been overwhelmed.[136] The first units of
the expeditionary force were not due at Cape Town for some ten days.
The complete disembarkation at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East
London would not be finished until early in December.[137] The British
Commander-in-Chief could not