atteries[140]) and the 9th Lancers were
also allotted to the 1st division.

[Footnote 140: The 62nd and half the 75th had been sent up to
Orange River in October; the other half of the 75th and the
18th batteries were delayed on the voyage out by the breaking
down of their transport, the _Zibenghla_, and did not land at
Cape Town until 1st November.]

[Sidenote: French's command.]

For Naauwpoort, General French, in addition to the original garrison
of that place, was at first given the assistance of the 12th Lancers,
a battery of R.H.A., and a half-battalion of the Black Watch, besides
two companies of M.I. To these other units were to be gradually added,
as soon as they became available.

[Sidenote: Gatacre's.]

Sir W. Gatacre was instructed to develop a force on the eastern
railway line from the original Stormberg garrison,[141] the 1st Royal
Scots (originally allotted as corps troops), the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers (a lines of communication battalion), the 2nd Royal Irish
Rifles (detached from the 5th brigade[142]), and the brigade division
(74th, 77th and 79th batteries), of the 3rd division, supplemented by
such colonial corps as he could gather together locally.

[Footnote 141: See Chapters II. and XVIII.]

[Footnote 142: This battalion was replaced in Hart's brigade
by the 1st Border regiment.]

The dates of the arrival of the various expeditionary units at Cape
Town and their disposal are shown in Appendix No. 7.

[Sidenote: Less serious injury of the recasting of army because of
ordinary British habit.]

The dislocation of the infantry divisions, which was caused by the
necessity for these sweeping changes, would have been even more
seriously detrimental had those divisions actually existed prior to
the embarkation of the troops from England; but, as has been shown in
an earlier chapter, one of the weak points of the British army in 1899
was the imperfect development in peace time of the higher organisation
of the troops. Except, therefore, in Major-General Hildyard's brigade,
which came direct from Aldershot,[143] and had been trained there by
its brigadier under the immediate eye of Sir R. Buller, that
confidence, which is established between troops and their superior
leaders by intimate mutual knowledge, did not exist, and could not be
affected by that reorganisation, which the strategical situation
necessitated.