ns (the strength
of his party being insufficient to man-handle more than two in the
soft ground), and with them ranged on the crest line, finding the
distance to be about 5,000 yards. The trains were then sent back about
half a mile, leaving, however, a trolly with ammunition. The Naval
guns, in conjunction with the field batteries, which had now come up,
continued to shell the Boer guns, and by 6.30 a.m. these for a time
ceased fire.

[Sidenote: Boers, reinforced, are stronger than expected.]

The estimate of the enemy's strength made by the reconnaissance of the
24th was not inaccurate, but the fact was that the situation had been
entirely changed by the arrival of Prinsloo with large reinforcements
later on that afternoon. The exact numbers of the Boers engaged in
this fight are, as in other cases, difficult to state with any
precision, but they were probably not less than about 2,300 men, with
three Krupp guns and two pom-poms. This force was disposed as
follows:--General De la Rey's commando of Transvaalers, consisting of
700 men and two Krupp guns, held the northern end of the kopjes on the
western flank, and was therefore on the north-western side of the
railway. Next on the western central kopje to the south-east of the
railway came the Winburg commando, about 250 with a Krupp gun, under
Commandant Jourdaan. These three Krupp guns were, however, controlled
by Major Albrecht, the officer commanding the Free State artillery.
The long kopje, at the southern end of which the western meets the
southern face, was held by the Bloemfontein commando, 500 strong,
under General J. Prinsloo. East of him, in the centre of the front
face, was placed the Jacobsdal commando, 300 strong, under Commandant
Lubbe. The eastern razor-backed kopje, which formed the left flank and
part of the frontal defence, was assigned to detachments of the
Bloemfontein, Hoopstad, and Fauresmith commandos under Commandants P.
Fourie and H. van der Venter. Two pom-poms were mounted on this side
of the defences. It will be seen from map 11 that the Graspan ground
differed in a marked way from the majority of the positions selected
by the Boers, being salient instead of re-entrant. It did not,
therefore, lend itself readily to the adoption of those enveloping
tactics which their forefathers learnt originally from the Zulus.
Prinsloo sought to remedy this defect by ordering up from Ramdam a
detachment to menace the eastern flank of the British advance