e been merely a blank."

The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; the
second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later Schleiden
sent home a further analysis of Lincoln:

"He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and
healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He
seems to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which
rests upon him. But at the same time it appears as if he had
lost some of his famous firmness and resoluteness through the
novelty of the conditions which surround him and the hourly
renewed attempts from various sides to gain influence over
him. He is therefore at present inclined to concede double
weight to the superior political experience of his Secretary
of State[200]."

This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly described.
Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not unchallenged and
soon a decision was called for that in its final solution was to
completely overthrow his already matured policy towards the seceding
States. Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possession
of federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federal
troops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he
had refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and
re-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On
March 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded
unless reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and
indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of his
Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an issue the
whole question of Seward's policy and leadership.

For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatory
delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting to
time and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and people
to a less violent attitude. He sincerely believed in the existence of an
as yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in those
States which were wavering on secession. He was holding communications,
through intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in
Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence that
State against secession. To all these Southern representatives he now
conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln,