ves, which they held entirely
independent of any desire, on the part of the people, that they should
exercise them, or even their _consent_ that they should do so. The
right to govern the realm of Great Britain was a sort of estate which
descended to Charles from his ancestors, and with the possession and
enjoyment of which the community had no right to interfere.

This seems, at first view, very absurd to us, but it is not
particularly absurd. Charles's lawyers would say to any plain
proprietor of a piece of land, who might call in question his right to
govern the country, The king holds his crown by precisely the same
tenure that you hold your farm. Why should you be the exclusive
possessor of that land, while so many poor beggars are starving?
Because it has descended to you from your ancestors, and nothing has
descended to them. And it is precisely so that the right to manage the
fleets and armies, and to administer the laws of the realm, has
descended, under the name of _sovereignty_, to him, and no such
political power has descended to you.

True, the farmer would reply; but in matters of government we are to
consider what will promote the general good. The great object to be
attained is the welfare and happiness of the community. Now, if this
general welfare comes into competition with the supposed rights of
individuals, arising from such a principle as hereditary succession,
the latter ought certainly to yield.

But why, might the lawyer reply, should rights founded on hereditary
succession yield any more readily in the case of _government_ than in
the case of _property_? The distribution of property influences the
general welfare quite as much as the management of power. Suppose it
were proved that the general welfare of your parish would be promoted
by the division of your land among the destitute there. You have
nothing to oppose to such a proposition but your hereditary right. And
the king has that to oppose to any plan of a division of his
prerogatives and powers among the people who would like to share them.

Whatever may be thought of this reasoning on this side of the
Atlantic, and at the present day, it was considered very satisfactory
in England two or three centuries ago. The true and proper
jurisdiction of an English monarch, as it had existed from ancient
times, was considered as an _absolute right_, vesting in each
successive inheritor of the crown, and which the community could not
justly int