supply, the
whole forming a vast system which moved on of itself, whether the king
were present or absent, sick or well, living or dead. It was so with
the army; it was so with the courts; it was so with the general
administration of the government, at London. The immense mass of
business which constituted the work of government was all systematized
and arranged, and it moved on regularly, in the hands of more or less
prudent and careful men, who governed, themselves, by ancient rules
and usages, and in most cases managed wisely.

Every thing, however, was done in the king's _name_. The ships were
his majesty's ships, the admirals were his majesty's servants, the
war was his majesty's war, the court was the _King's_ Bench. The idea
was, that all these thousands of officers, of all ranks and grades,
were only an enormous multiplication of his majesty; that they were to
do his will and carry on his administration as he would himself carry
it on were he personally capable of attending to such a vast detail;
subject, of course, to certain limits and restrictions which the laws
and customs of the realm, and the promises and contracts of his
predecessors, had imposed. But although all this action was
theoretically the king's action, it came to be, in fact, almost wholly
independent of him. It went on of itself, in a regular and systematic
way, pursuing its own accustomed course, except so far as the king
directly interposed to modify its action.

It might be supposed that the king would certainly take _the general
direction_ of affairs into his own hands, and that this charge, at
least, would necessarily come upon him, as king, day by day. Some
monarchs have attempted to do this, but it is obvious that there must
be some provision for having this general charge, as well as all the
subordinate functions of government, attended to independently of the
king, as his being always in a condition to fulfill this duty is not
to be relied upon. Sometimes the king is young and inexperienced;
sometimes he is sick or absent; and sometimes he is too feeble in
mind, or too indolent, or too devoted to his pleasures, to exercise
any governmental care. There has gradually grown up, therefore, in all
monarchies, the custom of having a central board of officers of state,
whom the king appoints, and who take the general direction of affairs
in his stead, except so far as he chooses to interfere. This board, in
England, is called the Privy Cou