orality which we
are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for
all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural
Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the
permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the
prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving
the misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial
distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the
world--these are facts, which no doubt are reconcilable, we
know not how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but which
certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that
its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite
goodness of man."

'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is
necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to
God is not the goodness which we know and love in our
fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree;
but is different in kind, and another quality altogether.
Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents,
the opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree
from finite goodness.--Here, then, I take my stand upon the
acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when
we mean different things we have no right to call them by
the same name, and to apply to them, the same predicates,
moral and intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that
there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the
highest human form can conceive, exist in a degree
inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled
by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are
we cannot learn, except that the highest human morality does
not sanction them--convince me of this and I will hear my
fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this,
and at the same time call this being by the names which
express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, in
plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a being
may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do; he
shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being
good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my
fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to
hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.'

This concluding declaration