subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and
unsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but,
previously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that
desiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory
of Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W.
Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many
objectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent
among mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of
Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle
which professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such
questions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used
in a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause.

In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's
doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this
chapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the
volume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and
the reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent
with what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap.
ii. Sec. 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the
theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the
idea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or
by James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word
_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces
it, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill
says (p. 331)--

'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the
words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to
express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a
general name, should ever have been invented.'

we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,'
however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent
with the purpose for which the name is given.

We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters
(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best
chapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of
Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of
his calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has
nothing to do