l's declaration stands in marked
contrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus. That
historian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are
envious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9]
Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous
in prayer and sacrifice--perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in
consequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being
persuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only
chance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself
is, by honorific tribute in words and offerings.

When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill's
declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on
the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess
that in this point of view it has little objective relevancy. The
problem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the
universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms
conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the
goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered
by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better
hypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr
Mansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he
considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we
reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are
applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood
about Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the
proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it
cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some
examples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:--

'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
sees, and the ear by one who hears.'

In the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God.

Now when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts
of extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly
physical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies
of nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with
direct sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past,