This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book
contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.

On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton
other good observations besides the one last alluded to; but,
unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent
opinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such
inconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W.
Hamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically
(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his
mind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back
upon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of
Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of
Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations
we shall call particular attention.

All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be
believed; but they differ much on the question--To what points
Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How
shall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is
the proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this
Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):--

'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods
of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical
difference between the two great schools into which
metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for
distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the
_psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the
question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas.
This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper
course would have been to begin by determining what the
ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness
now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to
frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental
phenomena.

'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend
that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations
of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any
regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to
follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas.
F