opinion that one of the two must be taken 'in a
non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not hold, or had
ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity of knowledge (pp.
20-28)--the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being in his view
inadmissible. But we think it at least equally possible that Sir W.
Hamilton held both the two opinions in their natural sense, and enforced
both of them _at different times_ by argument; his attention never
having been called to the contradiction between them. That such
forgetfulness was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of
the present article. His argument in support of both is equally
characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent with
him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements of one
struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.
From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at considerable
length what he justly denominates the celebrated and striking review of
Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first paper in Sir W. Hamilton's
'Discussions on Philosophy.' According to Mr Mill--
'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we
not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled
under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the
Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at
least, is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr
Mansel, for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is
one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that
the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the
concrete, and not conversely; and we shall see, both in the
case of Sir William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the
process cannot be reversed with impunity.'--p. 32.
Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here laid
down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the application of it
inconvenient in the present case. Discussions on points of philosophy
are best conducted without either invoking or offending religious
feeling. M. Cousin maintains that we have a direct intuition of the
Infinite and the Absolute: Sir W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon
this point Mr Mill sides entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers
'that the latter has rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M.
Cousin,' though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems
to Mr Mill unsound. B
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