e thinks that he cannot do
better than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody,
including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is,
and what is impiety. What then is piety?

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to
undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do,
prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing
as the gods do--as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that
this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety.
'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell
Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have
a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as
I do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety,
but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety
is what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of
opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good
and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of
differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear
to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both
pious and impious; e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may
be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his
own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered
at the hands of their sons).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among
gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins
Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the
point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are
you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the
gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you
not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving
this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and
say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is
impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.

Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows
that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being
carried