not stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature
of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the
Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of
piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the
popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not
offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares
the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to
his own character, refuses to answer himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the
same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing
steeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and
self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting
his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is
incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the
course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness,
positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure
to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which
is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is
friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest.
Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and
eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble
of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is
availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in
order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident
that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match
for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has
accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame.
To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever
may be the criminal.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the
narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion
which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing
as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many
others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are
not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own;
or that other nations, e.g. the Greek