s in the time of Socrates, were
equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief
difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what
we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the
distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution
of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian
diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was
teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or
whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any
rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is
ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the
very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he
suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one
answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by
the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care
about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise;
and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to
be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at
Athens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the
controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty
of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be
referred.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is
shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act,
corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle
(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb
(philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in
Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being
loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is
preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and
therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such
subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region
of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the
gods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of
justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a
moral foundation. He is seeking to realize t