le
to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of
State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to
be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of
foreigners and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions
upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the
late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an
economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the
States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the
quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to
an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further
increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to
procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for
any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in
the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an
unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous
to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to
the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive
expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced,
and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the
people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and
vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States
near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made
efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities;
while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss
as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure
of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions
of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States
which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be
charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the
deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much
reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how little
prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to
make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and
requisitions, whether it be applied to m
|