ts of their danger? If such presumptions
can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated
authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves
into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be
able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It
would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army
to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason
could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations
of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long
deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors,
would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be
unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that
very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from
the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what
pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in
time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of
some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not
within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against
the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so
visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be
raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of
the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to
have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those
calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot
be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even
result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever
be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common
defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than
in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil
altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not
easy to c
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