troduced a
similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable
to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,
under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to
reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was
superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done
without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that
of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both
in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government
established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of
peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up,
but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity
of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy
and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments
at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be
interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made
to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let
the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What
then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to
operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new
Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military
purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much,
is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an
imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper
provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and
powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of
keeping a military force on foot; to come to a
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