h the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions
to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that
there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly
shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder
and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states
into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by
a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it
would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or
a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in
the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES
or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The
COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of
the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of
interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing
that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is
the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this
association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the
distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this
enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the
novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS

1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

FEDERALIST No. 10

The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and