endance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting
subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The
limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,
on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the
Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the
forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude.
Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees,
it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it
from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four
miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be
eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance
from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven
hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of
several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system
commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal
larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is
continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment,
where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power.
Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as
it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the
island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required
of those of the most remote parts of the Union.

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is
not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern
all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by
the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can
extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately
provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it
proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of
the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their
objection; though it would not be diffi