nus. Since I do not know what they were, I therefore
argue that they were magical. I beg you to believe what I say, because
I am talking of that of which I know nothing.' What a wonderful
argument, in itself an obvious refutation of the charge. 'It must have
been this, because I do not know what it was.' You are the only person
hitherto discovered who knows that which he does not know. You so far
surpass all others in folly, that whereas philosophers of the most
keen and penetrating intellect assert that we should not trust even
the objects that we see, you make statements about things which you
have never seen or heard. If Pontianus still lived and you were to ask
him what the cloth contained, he would reply that he did not know.
There is the freedman who still has charge of the keys of the place;
he is one of your witnesses, but he says that he has never examined
these objects, although, as the servant responsible for the books kept
there, he opened and shut the doors almost daily, continually entered
the room, not seldom in my company but more often alone, and saw the
cloth lying on the table unprotected by seal or cord. Quite natural,
was it not? Magical objects were concealed in the cloth, and for that
reason I took little care for its safe custody, but left it about
anyhow for any one to examine and inspect, if he liked, or even to
carry it away! I entrusted it to the custody of others, I left it to
others to dispose of at their pleasure! What credence do you expect us
to give you after this? Are we to believe that you, on whom I have
never set eyes save in this court, know that of which Pontianus, who
actually lived under the same roof, was ignorant? or shall we believe
that you, who have never so much as approached the room where they
were placed, have seen what the freedman never saw, although he had
every opportunity to inspect them during the sedulous performance of
his duties? In a word, that which you never saw must have been what
you assert it to have been! And yet, you fool, if this very day you
had succeeded in getting that handkerchief into your hands, I should
deny the magical nature of whatever you might produce from it.

54. I give you full leave; invent what you like, rack your memory and
your imagination to discover something that might conceivably seem to
be of a magical nature. Even then, should you succeed in so doing, I
should argue the point with you. I should say that the object in
question h