far yielded as to say that indemnification need not be absolutely an
ultimatum. This settled the matter; the negotiators who _could_ yield
_must_ yield, and they did so. A sort of compromise article was
inserted: "that Congress should recommend to the state legislatures to
restore the estates, rights, and properties of real British subjects."
The American envoys knew that this was worthless, and the English
negotiators certainly were not deceived. But the article sounded well,
and gave at least a standing ground for the ministry to defend
themselves.[86]

[Note 85: Franklin's _Works_, viii. 218, text and note.]

[Note 86: It is not without interest in this connection to remark
that Franklin was very ill disposed towards the "loyalists," having
scant toleration for their choice of a party. For a man of his
liberality and moderation his language concerning them was severe. He
objected to calling them "loyalists," thinking "royalists" a more
correct description. To indemnification of their losses by Parliament he
had "no objection," for the damnatory reason that "even a hired assassin
has a right to his pay from his employer." Franklin's _Works_, ix. 133.
He often spoke in the like tone about these people. See, for example,
_Works_, ix. 70, 72. But when the war was over and the natural mildness
of his disposition could resume its sway, he once at least spoke more
gently of them. _Ibid_. 415.]

On November 30 the articles were at last signed, with the stipulation
that they were for the present merely preliminary and provisional, and
that they should be executed as a definitive treaty only simultaneously
with the execution of a treaty of peace between France and England.

The business was finished none too soon. In order to cover it the
meeting of Parliament had been postponed until December 5. The danger
which had been escaped, and which would not have been escaped had
Franklin had a less correct appreciation of relative values in the
negotiation, at once became apparent. The howl of condemnation swelled
loud in the House of Commons; it was felt that the ministry had made not
a treaty but a "capitulation." The unfortunate Shelburne was driven out
of power, pursued by an angry outcry from persons altogether incapable
of appreciating the sound statesmanship and the wise forecast of the
future advantage of England which he had shown in preferring to give
the colonies a chance to become a great, English-speaking,
English-s