erial must remain rather vague and indefinite. As we saw
above, even the Plotinic soul was inconsistently material rather than
immaterial. It was not excluded from space; it was referred to space
in an absurd way. The mind as common sense conceives it, is the
successor of this Plotinic soul, and seems to keep a flavor of what is
material after all. This will come out in the next chapter, where we
shall discuss mind and body.
33. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE MIND.--When we ask how the psychologist
conceives of the mind, we must not forget that psychologists are many
and that they differ more or less from each other in their opinions.
When we say "the psychologist" believes this or that, we mean usually
no more than that the opinion referred to is prevalent among men of
that class, or that it is the opinion of those whom we regard as its
more enlightened members.
Taking the words in this somewhat loose sense, I shall ask what the
psychologist's opinion is touching the four points set forth in the
preceding section. How far does he agree with the plain man?
(1) There can be no doubt that he refers the mind to the body in some
way, although he may shake his head over the use of the word "in."
(2) As to whether the mind acts and reacts with matter, in any sense of
the words analogous to that in which they are commonly used, there is a
division in the camp. Some affirm such interaction; some deny it. The
matter will be discussed in the next chapter.
(3) The psychologist--the more modern one--inclines to repudiate any
substance or substratum of the sort accepted in the Middle Ages and
believed in by many men now. To him the mind is the whole complex of
mental phenomena in their interrelations. In other words, the mind is
not an unknown and indescribable something that is merely inferred; it
is something revealed in consciousness and open to observation.
(4) The psychologist is certainly not inclined to regard the mind or
any idea belonging to it as material or as extended. But he does
recognize implicitly, if not explicitly, that ideas are composite. To
him, as to the plain man, the image held in the memory or imagination
_seems_ to be extended, and he can distinguish its parts. He does not
do much towards clearing away the difficulty alluded to at the close of
the last section. It remains for the metaphysician to do what he can
with it, and to him we must turn if we wish light upon this obscure
subject.
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