that we are never free?

To many persons it has seemed that we are forced to draw this conclusion,
and it is not surprising that they view the doctrine with dismay. They
argue: Mental phenomena are made parallel with physical, and the order of
physical phenomena seems to be determined throughout, for nothing can
happen in the world of matter unless there is some adequate cause of its
happening. If, then, I choose to raise my finger, that movement must be
admitted to have physical causes, and those causes other causes, and so
on without end. If such a movement must always have its place in a
causal series of this kind, how can it be regarded as a free movement?
It is determined, and not free.

Now, it is far from a pleasant thing to watch the man of science busily
at work trying to prove that the physical world is an orderly system, and
all the while to feel in one's heart that the success of his efforts
condemns one to slavery. It can hardly fail to make one's attitude
towards science that of alarm and antagonism. From this I shall try to
free the reader by showing that our freedom is not in the least danger,
and that we may look on unconcerned.

When we approach that venerable dispute touching the freedom of the will,
which has inspired men to such endless discussions, and upon which they
have written with such warmth and even acrimony, the very first thing to
do is to discover what we have a right to mean when we call a man _free_.
As long as the meaning of the word is in doubt, the very subject of the
dispute is in doubt. When may we, then, properly call a man free? What
is the normal application of the term?

I raise my finger. Every man of sense must admit that, under normal
conditions, I can raise my finger or keep it down, _as I please_. There
is no ground for a difference of opinion so far. But there is a further
point upon which men differ. One holds that my "pleasing" and the
brain-change that corresponds to it have their place in the world-order;
that is, he maintains that every volition can be _accounted for_.
Another holds that, under precisely the same circumstances, one may
"please" or not "please"; which means that the "pleasing" cannot be
wholly accounted for by anything that has preceded. The first man is a
_determinist_, and the second a "_free-willist_." I beg the reader to
observe that the word "free-willist" is in quotation marks, and not to
suppose that it means simply a believer