FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125  
126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   >>   >|  
s a link in the physical chain of causes and effects--he breaks the chain to insert it. The parallelist maintains that it is inconceivable that such an insertion should be made. He regards the physical series as complete in itself, and he places the consciousness, as it were, on a _parallel_ line. It must not be supposed that he takes this figure literally. It is his effort to avoid materializing the mind that forces him to hold the position which he does. To put the mind in the brain is to make of it a material thing; to make it parallel to the brain, in the literal sense of the word, would be just as bad. All that we may understand him to mean is that mental phenomena and physical, although they are related, cannot be built into the one series of causes and effects. He is apt to speak of them as _concomitant_. We must not forget that neither parallelist nor interactionist ever dreams of repudiating our common experiences of the relations of mental phenomena and physical. Neither one will, if he is a man of sense, abandon the usual ways of describing such experiences. Whatever his theory, he will still say: I am suffering because I struck my hand against that table; I sat down because I chose to do so. His doctrine is not supposed to deny the truth contained in such statements; it is supposed only to give a fuller understanding of it. Hence, we cannot condemn either doctrine simply by an uncritical appeal to such statements and to the experiences they represent. We must look much deeper. Now, what can the parallelist mean by _referring_ sensations and ideas to the brain and yet denying that they are _in_ the brain? What is this reference? Let us come back to the experiences of the physical and the mental as they present themselves to the plain man. They have been discussed at length in Chapter IV. It was there pointed out that every one distinguishes without difficulty between sensations and things, and that every one recognizes explicitly or implicitly that a sensation is an experience referred in a certain way to the body. When the eyes are open, we _see_; when the ears are open, we _hear_; when the hand is laid on things, we _feel_. How do we know that we are experiencing sensations? The setting tells us that. The experience in question is given together with an experience of the body. This is _concomitance of the mental and the physical_ as it appears in the experience of us all; and fr
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125  
126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

physical

 

experience

 

mental

 

experiences

 

parallelist

 

sensations

 
supposed
 

phenomena

 

things

 

series


effects

 

doctrine

 
statements
 

parallel

 

condemn

 

understanding

 

present

 
fuller
 
reference
 

referring


represent

 
uncritical
 

deeper

 
denying
 
appeal
 

simply

 

explicitly

 

experiencing

 
setting
 

concomitance


appears

 

question

 

pointed

 

distinguishes

 

length

 

Chapter

 

difficulty

 

sensation

 

referred

 
implicitly

recognizes

 
discussed
 

material

 

position

 
materializing
 

forces

 

literal

 

understand

 
effort
 

inconceivable