s in some intelligible sense of the word. It will not do to
say: I use the word "in," but I do not really mean _in_. If the
meaning has disappeared, why continue to use the word? It can only
lead to mystification.

Descartes seemed to come back to something like an intelligible meaning
when he put the mind in the pineal gland in the brain. Yet, as we have
seen, he clung to the old conception. He could not go back to the
frank materialization of mind.

And the plain man to-day labors under the same difficulty. He puts the
mind in the body, in the brain, but he does not put it there frankly
and unequivocally. It is in the brain and yet not exactly in the
brain. Let us see if this is not the case.

If we ask him: Does the man who wags his head move his mind about? does
he who mounts a step raise his mind some inches? does he who sits down
on a chair lower his mind? I think we shall find that he hesitates in
his answers. And if we go on to say: Could a line be so drawn as to
pass through your image of me and my image of you, and to measure their
distance from one another? I think he will say, No. He does not
regard minds and their ideas as existing in space in this fashion.

Furthermore, it would not strike the plain man as absurd if we said to
him: Were our senses far more acute than they are, it is conceivable
that we should be able to perceive every atom in a given human body,
and all its motions. But would he be willing to admit that an increase
in the sharpness of sense would reveal to us directly the mind
connected with such a body? It is not, then, in the body as the atoms
are. It cannot be seen or touched under any conceivable circumstances.
What can it mean, hence, to say that it is _there_? Evidently, the
word is used in a peculiar sense, and the plain man cannot help us to a
clear understanding of it.

His position becomes intelligible to us when we realize that he has
inherited the doctrine that the mind is immaterial, and that he
struggles, at the same time, with the tendency so natural to man to
conceive it after the analogy of things material. He thinks of it as
in the body, and, nevertheless, tries to dematerialize this "in." His
thought is sufficiently vague, and is inconsistent, as might be
expected.

If we will bear in mind what was said in the closing section of the
last chapter, we can help him over his difficulty. That mind and body
are related there can be no doubt. But shou