ot say that; he still held to
it. But how could he? The reader has perhaps remarked above that he
speaks of the soul as having her _chief_ seat in the pineal gland. It
seems odd that he should do so, but he still held, even after he had
come to his definite conclusions as to the soul's seat, to the ancient
doctrine that the soul is united to all the parts of the body
"conjointly." He could not wholly repudiate a venerable tradition.
We have seen, thus, that men first conceived of the mind as material
and later came to rebel against such a conception. But we have seen,
also, that the attempt to conceive it as immaterial was not wholly
successful. It resulted in a something that we may describe as
inconsistently material rather than as not material at all.
32. MODERN COMMON SENSE NOTIONS OF THE MIND.--Under this heading I mean
to sum up the opinions as to the nature of the mind usually held by the
intelligent persons about us to-day who make no claim to be regarded as
philosophers. Is it not true that a great many of them believe:--
(1) That the mind is in the body?
(2) That it acts and reacts with matter?
(3) That it is a substance with attributes?
(4) That it is nonextended and immaterial?
I must remark at the outset that this collection of opinions is by no
means something gathered by the plain man from his own experience.
These opinions are the echoes of old philosophies. They are a heritage
from the past, and have become the common property of all intelligent
persons who are even moderately well-educated. Their sources have been
indicated in the preceding sections; but most persons who cherish them
have no idea of their origin.
Men are apt to suppose that these opinions seem reasonable to them
merely for the reason that they find in their own experience evidence
of their truth. But this is not so.
Have we not seen above how long it took men to discover that they must
not think of the mind as being a breath, or a flame, or a collection of
material atoms? The men who erred in this way were abler than most of
us can pretend to be, and they gave much thought to the matter. And
when at last it came to be realized that mind must not thus be
conceived as material, those who endeavored to conceive it as something
else gave, after their best efforts, a very queer account of it indeed.
Is it in the face of such facts reasonable to suppose that our friends
and acquaintances, who strike us as hav
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