that representations as related to an object must
agree among themselves. But this statement, to be significant, implies
that the object to which various representations are related is _one
and the same_. Otherwise why should the representations agree? In
view, therefore, of these last two considerations we must admit that
the real thought underlying Kant's statement should be expressed thus:
'We find that the thought that _two or more parts or qualities of an
object_ relate to _one and the same object_ carries with it a certain
necessity, since this object is considered to be that which _prevents
these parts or qualities which we know it to possess_ from being
determined at random, because by being related to _one and the same
object_, they must agree among themselves.' The importance of the
correction lies in the fact that what Kant is stating is not what he
thinks he is stating. He is really stating the implication of the
thought that two or more qualities or parts of some object or other,
which, as such, already relate to an object, relate to one and the
same object. He thinks he is stating the implication of the thought
that a representation which in itself has no relation to an object,
has relation to an object. And since his problem is simply to
determine what constitutes the relatedness to an object of that which
in itself is a mere representation, the distinction is important; for
it shows that he really elucidates it by an implication respecting
something which already has relation to an object and is not a mental
modification at all, but a quality or a part of an object.

[43] Cf. pp. 230-3.

[44] _Erkenntnisse._

[45] _Vorgestellt._

Kant continues thus: "But it is clear that, since we have to do only
with the manifold of our representations, and the _x_, which
corresponds to them (the object), since it is to be something distinct
from all our representations, is for us nothing, the unity which the
object necessitates can be nothing else than the formal unity of
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations."
[I. e. since the object which produces systematic unity in our
representations is after all only the unknown thing in itself, viz.
_x_,[46] any of the parts or qualities of which it is impossible to
know, that to which it gives unity can be only our representations
and not its own parts or qualities. For, since we do not know any
of its parts or qualities, these repr