f Courtrai, and the
bait which a facile temporary success always holds out for a man who has
formed no consistent general plan. But that very excuse is the strongest
condemnation of the inexcusable error, and this strategical fault of
Pichegru's was soon paid for by the imperilling of all the great body of
French troops within that rashly projected triangle.

For the moment Pichegru may have foolishly congratulated himself that he
had done something of military value, as he had certainly done something
striking. Menin fell to the French on the same day that Landrecies did to
the Austrians, and this further success doubtless tempted him to remain
with the head of his wedge at Courtrai, when every consideration of
strategy should have prompted him to retrace his steps and to recall the
over-advanced division back into line.

This isolated position down the valley of the Lys, this wedge thrust out
in front of Lille, positively asked the allies to attack it.

The enemy was a fortnight developing his plan, but his delay was equalled
by Pichegru's determination to hold the advanced post he had captured; and
when the allies did finally close in upon that advanced post, nothing but
a series of accidents, which we shall follow in detail when we come to the
story of the action, saved Souham from annihilation. And the destruction
of Souham's division, considering its numbers and its central position,
might have involved the whole French line in a general defeat.

As I have said, it was at the end of April that this false success of
Pichegru's was achieved, and a whole fortnight was to elapse before the
allies concentrated to take advantage of that error, and to cut off
Souham's division.

That fortnight was full of minor actions, not a few of them interesting to
the student of military history, and one again remarkable as a feat of
English horse. I deliberately omit all mention of these lest I should
confuse the reader and disturb his conception of the great battle that
was to follow.

That battle proceeded upon a certain plan thought out in detail, perfectly
simple in character, and united in conception. It failed, as we shall see;
and by its failure turned what should have been the cutting-off and
destruction of Souham's command into a signal French victory. But before
we can understand the causes of its failure, we must grasp the plan itself
in its major lines, and with that object I shall discuss it in my next
section un