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own from the north, all the rest of the allies coming up from the east and the south must march with the common object of reaching "R," a fixed rendezvous, agreed upon beforehand, and of meeting there together at some appointed time. If any considerable body lagged behind the rest, if part of the great force marching up from the south, for instance, failed to keep in line with the general advance, or if Clerfayt bungled or delayed, the junction would be imperfect or might even not take place at all, and the number of men present to cut off the French when a partial and imperfect junction had been effected, might be too small to maintain itself astraddle of the French communications, and to prevent the great French force from breaking its way through back to Lille. So much for synchrony: and as for surprise, it is obvious that for the success of this plan it was necessary to work both rapidly and secretly. Here was Souham with a body of men which recent reinforcement had raised to some 40,000, lying much too far ahead of the general French line and in peril of being cut off. Pichegru was foolish to maintain him in that advanced position, but, though that was an error, it was an error based upon a certain amount of calculation. Pichegru, and Souham under his orders, kept to their perilous position round Courtrai, because it did after all cut the allies in two, and because they knew that they could deal with Clerfayt's force upon the north (which was only half their own), while they also knew that the bulk of their enemies were tied down, far away to the south, by the operations round Landrecies. If Souham at Courtrai got news in time of the march northward of that main southern force, he had only to fall back upon Lille to be saved. It was not until the 10th of May that the plan was elaborated whereby it was hoped to annihilate Souham's command, and this plan seems to have occurred first to the Duke of York upon the evening of that day, after a successful minor action between his troops and the French just outside Tournai. The Duke of York had been at Tournai a week, having come up there from Landrecies after the fall of that fortress, though the mass of the Austrian forces still remained away in the south. The week had been spent in "feeling" the south-eastern front of the French advanced "wedge," and it was by the evening of the 10th that the Duke of York appears to have decided that the time was ripe for a gen
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