of remark that the only real cause of peril was the
absence of Kinsky and the Arch-Duke.

Certain historians have committed the strange error of blaming Bussche for
what followed. Bussche, it will be remembered, had been driven out of
Mouscron early in the day, and was holding on stubbornly enough, keeping
up an engagement principally by cannonade with the French upon the line of
Dottignies. It is obvious that from such a position he could be of no use
to the isolated Otto and York five miles away. But on the other hand, he
was not expected to be of any use. What could his 4000 have done to shield
the 20,000 of Otto and York from those 40,000 French under Souham's
command? His business was to keep as many of the French as possible
occupied away on the far north-east of the field, and that object he was
fulfilling.

Finally, it may be asked why, in a posture so patently perilous, Otto and
York clung to their advanced positions throughout the night? The answer is
simple enough. If, even during the night, the fourth and fifth columns
should appear, the battle was half won. If Clerfayt, of whom they had no
news, but whom they rightly judged to be by this time across the Lys, were
to arrive before the French began to close in, the battle would be not
half won, but all won. Between 55,000 and 60,000 men would then be lying
united across the line which joined the 40,000 of the enemy to the north
with the 20,000 to the south. If such a junction were effected even at the
eleventh hour, so long as it took place before the 20,000 French outside
Lille and the 40,000 to the north moved upon them, the allies would have
won a decisive action, and the surrender of all Souham's command would
have been the matter of a few hours. For a force cut in two is a force
destroyed.

But the night passed without Clerfayt's appearing, and before closing the
story of that Saturday I must briefly tell why, though he had crossed the
Lys in the afternoon, he failed to advance southward through the
intervening five or six miles to Mouveaux.

CLERFAYT'S COLUMN.

Clerfayt had, in that extraordinary slow march of his, advanced by the
Friday night, as I have said, no further than the great high road between
Menin and Ypres. I further pointed out that though only three miles
separated that point from Wervicq, yet those three miles meant, under the
military circumstances of the moment, a loss of time equivalent to at
least half a day.

We therefore l