the continental system. Nevertheless,
the fiscal and foreign policy of France at this date alike show how far
the continental system had failed in its object, and to what extreme
lengths it had become necessary to push it in order to give it a chance
of success. The strain of the system on English commerce was immense,
but the burden fell far more heavily on the continental nations.
Colonial produce rose to enormous prices in France, Germany, and Italy,
especially after the introduction of the Trianon tariff, and a subject
or ally of the French emperor had to pay ten times as much for his
morning cup of coffee as his enemy in London. The German opposition to
Napoleon had failed in 1809 mainly through the political apathy of the
German nation. Napoleon's fiscal measures were the surest way of
bringing that apathy to an end, and converting it into hostility.

The events of December, 1810, and January, 1811, constituted a distinct
breach between France and Russia, which could only end in war, unless
one party or the other should withdraw from its position. A few months
sufficed to show that no such withdrawal would take place; but neither
power was prepared for war, and seventeen months elapsed after the
breach before hostilities began. The intervening period was spent in
negotiation and preparation. Much depended on the alliances that the
rival powers might be able to contract. Although Napoleon had bound
himself not to restore Poland, he had by the creation and subsequent
enlargement of the duchy of Warsaw given it a semblance of national
unity, and had inspired the Poles with the hope of a more complete
independence. The Polish troops were among the most devoted in the
French army, and the position of their country rendered the support of
the Poles a matter of great importance in any war with Russia. It
occurred to the Tsar Alexander that he might win their support for
himself by a restoration of Poland, under the suzerainty of Russia. He
promised Czartoryski the restoration of the eight provinces under a
guarantee of autonomy, and undertook to obtain the cession of Galicia.
On February 13, 1811, he made a secret offer to Austria of a part of
Moldavia in exchange for Galicia. Nothing came of this, but the massing
of Russian troops on the Polish frontier in March was met by the hurried
advance of French troops through Germany, and war seemed imminent until
Russia postponed the struggle by withdrawing her troops.

Meanw